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INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 2005, an employee of Airo Die Casting was picketing and
yelled “fuck you n[-----]!” to a Black security guard leaving work.1 On
January 7, 2012, an employee of Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. was picketing
outside their facility when a van full of mostly Black replacement workers
entered the facility.2 The employee yelled, “Hey, anybody smell that? I
Copyright 2021, by CASEY THIBODEAUX.
 J.D./D.C.L. candidate 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.
1. Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 810, 811 (2006).
2. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (Cooper Tire I), 2015 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
178146, 2015 WL 3544120, at *3 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015),
adopted as modified, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (May 17, 2016), 2016 WL 2894792,
enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017).
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smell fried chicken and watermelon.”3 On October 2, 1989, a picketing
employee at Wayne Stead Cadillac grabbed his testicles and gyrated his
hips towards a car while mouthing “fuck you” to a security guard.4 The
guard’s eight-year-old daughter was in the car with him at the time.5
Unsurprisingly, each of the respective employers terminated these
employees due to their misconduct.6 In each of these cases, however, the
National Labor Relations Board found that the terminations were unfair
labor practices and ordered the companies to reinstate the employees.7
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees for engaging in
concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.8 The Act gives
employees the right to join a union, bargain collectively over wages and
working conditions, and engage in other concerted activities for “mutual
aid or protection.”9 The right to act in concert applies to most privatesector employees, regardless of whether a union represents them.10
However, there are limits to the conduct employees can engage in and still
retain protection of the Act.11 The National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “the Board”) has decided several lines of cases that
considered what types of conduct in certain settings lost the protection of
the Act.12 The NLRB’s decisions have sometimes protected racially or
sexually offensive behavior, forcing employers to accept conduct that may

3. Id.
4. Wayne Stead Cadillac, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Airo Die Casting, 347 N.L.R.B. 810; Cooper Tire I, 2016 WL 2894792;
Wayne Stead Cadillac, 303 N.L.R.B. at 432.
7. Airo Die Casting, 347 N.L.R.B. 810; Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (Cooper
Tire II), 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (May 17, 2016), 2016 WL 2894792; Wayne Stead
Cadillac, 303 N.L.R.B. at 432.
8. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
9. Id. § 7.
10. John R. Runyan & Mami Kato, What Every Employment Lawyer Needs
to Know About the National Labor Relations Act, 92 MICH. B.J. 34 (2013). One
example of concerted activity by non-union employees is an agreement by
workers to wear certain color shirts on a particular day to protest wage cuts or
other workplace rules. Id.
11. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567–68 (1978); Tex.
Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 822, 830 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Wash.
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962).
12. See Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July
21, 2020), 2020 WL 4193017.
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expose them to liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) and other antidiscrimination laws.13
In General Motors LLC, the NLRB reconsidered its previous
approaches to dealing with racially or sexually offensive conduct and other
misconduct occurring during otherwise protected activity, such as
picketing or representing employee concerns to management.14 The Board
overruled its prior decisions establishing several different setting-specific
standards for determining whether employee misconduct was so
“opprobrious” that the employee lost the protection of the Act.15 The
Board held that it will now review “abusive conduct” that occurs during
the course of NLRA Section 7 protected activity using the Wright Line
burden-shifting framework.16
In its decision, the NLRB did not define “abusive conduct” and did
not decide how to evaluate misconduct that falls short of “abusive” in
future cases.17 The failure to define “abusive conduct” means that
employers, unions, employees, and Administrative Law Judges currently
lack clarity on what types of conduct the NLRA protects.18 A Democratic
board under the Biden administration may result in a narrower
interpretation of “abusive conduct,” because Democratic boards tend to be
more protective of unions.19 This change in administrations underscores
the unpredictability of how the NLRB will apply General Motors LLC in
future cases.20 An overly expansive reading of “abusive conduct” in the
future will unnecessarily restrict employees’ statutory right to engage in
protected activity, contrary to the purpose of the NLRA.21
The NLRB should provide additional guidance on what constitutes
employee misconduct so severe that an employee loses the protection of
the Act. The General Motors LLC decision was appropriate as applied to
13. Ryan Vann & Melissa Logan, The Tension Between the NLRA, The
EEOC, and Other Federal and State Employment Laws, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 291, 292 (2018).
14. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017.
15. Id. at *1.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Amy Semet, Political Decision-Making at the National Labor
Relations Board: An Empirical Examination of the Board’s Unfair Labor
Practice Decisions Through the Clinton and Bush II Years, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 223 (2016).
20. See id. at 273.
21. See Lauren P. McDermott, Unprotected Profanity: The Erosion of an
Employee’s Right to Convey Grievances, 4 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 1 (2014).
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sexually and racially offensive conduct, and the definition of “abusive
conduct” should also apply to other conduct that directly creates potential
liability for the employer under antidiscrimination or other employment
statutes. The definition of “abusive conduct” should not, however,
encompass merely profane or insulting language. To address conduct that
falls short of “abusive,” the NLRB should consolidate its setting-specific
standards and apply a modified version of Atlantic Steel22 to conduct that
occurs in the course of Section 7 activity, regardless of the setting.
Part I introduces the NLRA, Title VII, other antidiscrimination laws,
and the employer obligations under each. Part II provides an overview of
the various standards that the NLRB previously applied to instances of
employee discipline involving protected Section 7 activity. Part III
discusses General Motors LLC, a recent NLRB opinion involving abusive
and racially tinged conduct, which took place during the course of Section
7 protected activity. Part IV proposes a standard for “abusive conduct” that
includes conduct that exposes an employer to liability under Title VII or
other federal, state, or local antidiscrimination laws. In addition, this Part
proposes that the NLRB should evaluate conduct that falls short of abusive
under the Atlantic Steel framework rather than under the Wright Line
burden-shifting framework.
I. THE EMPLOYER’S SIMULTANEOUS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NLRA
AND TITLE VII
The default employment relationship in the United States is at-will
employment.23 In an at-will employment relationship, either party can
generally terminate the relationship at any time, with or without cause.24
The default rule of employment at-will demonstrates that the legislatures
and courts in the United States generally do not regulate even the most
extreme adverse employment action—termination.25 By extension, less
extreme adverse actions, such as suspension or demotion, are also largely

22. See infra Section II.B.1.
23. JOHN BOURDEAU & BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE, 82 AM. JUR. 2D
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE § 2 (2d ed. 2020).
24. Id.
25. Under employment at-will, an employer can terminate an employee for a
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. For example, after the Green Bay
Packers beat the Chicago Bears in the NFC Championship in 2011, a car
dealership in Chicago fired a salesman for wearing a Packers tie to work. STEVEN
L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 80 (Carolina Academic Press, 6th ed.
2017).
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unregulated.26 However, there are exceptions to at-will employment,
including employment contracts that specify a duration of the employment
agreement27 and statutory protections that prohibit terminations and other
adverse actions based on certain protected characteristics.28 For example,
Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws prohibit employers from
discriminating in hiring, firing, and other terms and conditions of
employment based on statutorily protected characteristics such as race or
gender.29 The NLRA provides additional statutory protections to
employees by prohibiting employers from taking adverse actions,
including discharge, against employees because of their participation in
certain protected activities.30
A. The National Labor Relations Act
In the early nineteenth century, employers unilaterally set wages and
working conditions, terminated employees without cause, and blacklisted
union supporters.31 Employees seeking to alter their wages or conditions
of employment would sometimes resort to a strike—a “concerted refusal
of employees to work”—until the employer changed its wages or working
conditions.32 Judges were hostile to strikes and frequently issued
injunctions ordering strikers to cease and desist.33 In 1932, Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, limiting the use of injunctions against
labor strikes.34 However, employers retained the right to unilaterally set
working conditions and refused to recognize unions.35
26. Ruth Mayhew, Federal Labor Laws Regarding Discipline &
Termination, CHRON, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/federal-labor-laws-regard
ing-discipline-termination-56444.html [https://perma.cc/WS2Q-CC7R] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2021).
27. BOURDEAU & VAN ARSDALE, supra note 23.
28. William Homer, Just Cause for Trust: Honoring the Expectation of
Loyalty in the At-Will Employment Relationship, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 833, 836
(2018).
29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a).
30. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
31. 8 WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 10601 (2020).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Pre-Wagner Act Labor Relations, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.
nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/pre-wagner-act-labor-relations
[https://perma.cc/UV3K-9HHX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
35. 8 WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 10601 (2020).

360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd 236

11/19/21 12:01 PM

2021]

COMMENT

233

During the Great Depression, hostility toward employers grew,36 and
the public demanded federal intervention.37 In response, Congress passed
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (“NIRA”), which guaranteed
the right to form unions, but this did little to calm the industrial strife.38 In
August 1933, President Roosevelt created the National Labor Board
(“NLB”), comprised of three industry representatives, three labor
representatives, and chaired by Senator Robert F. Wagner.39 The NLB
ultimately lacked the enforcement power necessary to effectively resolve
disputes, and the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional on
May 27, 1935.40
By the time the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA, Senator Wagner
was already drafting a new bill, the NLRA, to address the enforcement
problems with the previous NLB.41 Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935,
granting employees the right to bargain collectively.42 The NLRA created
the NLRB to enforce the Act.43 Initially, employers defied the NLRA,
assuming that, like the NIRA, the Supreme Court would declare it
unconstitutional.44 In 1937, however, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NLRA.45 Congress has amended the NLRA several
times since its passage, but the right to bargain collectively and engage in
other concerted activity and the existence of the NLRB as an enforcement
agency remain key features of the Act.46

36. Id.
37. Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor
Relations Act, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 427, 434 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds.,
2012).
38. Id.
39. 1933 The NLB and “The Old NLRB,” NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://
www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1933-the-nlb-and-the-old-nlrb
[https://perma.cc/FS3J-4ZAF] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
40. The Supreme Court invalidated NIRA in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Wachter, supra note 37.
41. 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://
www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-of-the-wagneract [https://perma.cc/H43V-ZCCP] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
42. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
43. 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, supra note 41.
44. Wachter, supra note 37.
45. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
46. See, e.g., Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947);
Landrum Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
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1. The NLRA Creates Certain Protections & Obligations for
Employees and Employers
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees have the right to join
a union, bargain collectively, and “engage in other concerted activit[y] for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”47
The NLRB considers an employee’s activity concerted if the employee is
acting in conjunction with or on behalf of other employees.48 The courts
have interpreted the meaning of “mutual aid or protection” broadly.49
“Mutual aid or protection” encompasses not only activity that is directed
at conditions that the employer has within its control, but also activity “in
support of employees of [other] employers” and “through channels outside
the immediate employee-employer relationship.”50 While most complaints
arise in a union-represented context, the protections of Section 7 also
extend to non-union-represented employees engaging in concerted
activity.51 Therefore, it is important for all covered employers,52 whether
or not a union represents their employees, to understand employee rights
and employer obligations under the NLRA.53
Section 7 protection does have limits, and an employee can lose the
protection of the Act if his or her conduct is too egregious.54 The Supreme
Court first established limits to Section 7 protection in NLRB v. Local
Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), discussing the need to engage in an
“inquiry to determine whether [the] concerted activities were carried on in
such a manner as to come within the protection of [Section] 7.”55 Activity
that is unlawful, violent, has the potential to damage the employer’s
47. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
48. Runyan & Kato, supra note 10, at 35.
49. See Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
50. Id. at 562–65 (holding that the “mutual aid or protection” clause protected
portions of a union-sponsored newsletter urging employees to write to legislators
to oppose a right-to-work provision in the state constitution and criticizing a
presidential veto of an increase in the federal minimum wage).
51. Runyan & Kato, supra note 10.
52. The United States, Federal Reserve banks, states and political
subdivisions, and entities covered by the Railway Act are not covered employers
under the Act. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2).
53. Runyan & Kato, supra note 10.
54. See, e.g., Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567–68; Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB,
637 F.2d 822, 830 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,
17 (1962).
55. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 475
(1953).
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property, or is insubordinate or disloyal may fall outside of the protection
of the NLRA.56
Section 8 of the NLRA details a list of activities that constitute an
unfair labor practice for employers and unions.57 Section 8(a)(1) provides
a broad prohibition against employers “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or
coerc[ing] employees” in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.58 A
violation of Section 8(a)(1) may be independent of any other violations,59
or if the employer commits an unfair labor practice under any of the other
subsections of Section 8(a), it commits a derivative violation of Section
8(a)(1).60 Section 8(a)(3) makes discrimination against certain employees
for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union membership an
unfair labor practice.61 Other subsections of Section 8 prohibit the
employer from dominating or providing illegal support or contributions to
a union, retaliating against employees who have filed charges with the
NLRB, and refusing to bargain with the union in good faith.62
2. Enforcement of the NLRA Through Adjudication and Rulemaking
The NLRA created the NLRB as an enforcement agency.63 The NLRB
consists of five members, appointed by the president for five-year terms,
with one member’s term expiring each year.64 Customarily, the party
56. Id. at 464 (upholding the NLRB’s refusal to reinstate employees who
distributed a disparaging handbill unrelated to a labor dispute); Wash. Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. at 17; Tex. Instruments, 637 F.2d at 830.
57. National Labor Relations Act § 8.
58. Id. § 8(a)(1).
59. Examples of independent Section 8(a)(1) violations are: threatening
employees if they vote to join a union, threatening to close a facility if a union is
organized in it, spying on union gatherings, and granting wage increases timed
specifically to discourage employees from voting for a union. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 14
(1997), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/node-184/bas
icguide.pdf. [https://perma.cc/B7GY-PQ4R].
60. TED SCOTT ET AL., EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.
61. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3). Examples of Section 8(a)(3)
violations are: discharging employees because of their support for a union,
refusing to reinstate employees because of their participation in a lawful strike,
and demoting employees because they acted together to ask for wage increases.
BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 59.
62. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a).
63. Id. § 3(a).
64. Id.
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holding the White House will have a three-to-two advantage on the
NLRB.65 Republican boards tend to be more management friendly, while
Democratic boards tend to be more union friendly.66
The Act empowers the NLRB to prevent the commission of unfair
labor practices by employers and unions, issue complaints and hold
hearings to determine if a party committed an unfair labor practice, issue
cease-and-desist orders, and order affirmative actions such as
reinstatement of employees.67 In addition to the NLRB members, the
General Counsel of the NLRB and Administrative Law Judges play
important roles in the enforcement of the NLRA.68 The General Counsel
is responsible for investigating and prosecuting unfair labor practices.69
The General Counsel is independent from the Board and is appointed by
the president to a four-year term.70 The Administrative Law Judges hold
hearings over unfair labor practice complaints.71
If employees believe that their employer committed an unfair labor
practice and violated their Section 7 rights, the employees may file a
charge against their employer with the regional director of the NLRB.72
Board agents investigate the charge and issue findings to the regional
director.73 If the NLRB investigation finds evidence supporting the charge
and the parties cannot reach a settlement, the General Counsel issues a
complaint.74 An Administrative Law Judge will hold a hearing for the
65. NLRB is Likely to Operate with Just Four Members for the Time Being,
FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (July 31, 2018), https://laborlaw.foxrothschild.com/
2018/07/articles/general-labor-law-news-updates/national-labor-relations-boardnlrb/nlrb-is-likely-to-operate-with-just-four-members-for-the-time-being/#:~:tex
t=A%20fully%20constituted%20NLRB%20is,by%20three%2Dmember%20NL
RB%20panels.&text=By%20custom%2C%20the%20NLRB%20will,to%20over
rule%20the%20extant%20precedent [https://perma.cc/72SQ-J6VQ].
66. Id.
67. National Labor Relations Act § 10.
68. Who We Are, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/bio/generalcounsel [https://perma.cc/Z9JL-CGPF] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
69. General Counsel, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/bio/
general-counsel [https://perma.cc/C2VC-F482] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
70. Id.
71. Division of Judges, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/who-we-are/division-of-judges [https://perma.cc/R94G-ZGBG] (last visited
Sept. 30, 2020).
72. Investigate Charges, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about
-nlrb/what-we-do/investigate-charges [https://perma.cc/679S-U8HC] (last visited
Sept. 30, 2020).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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complaint, with the NLRB General Counsel’s office representing the
charging party.75 The Administrative Law Judge will issue a
recommendation, which will become the NLRB decision unless one of the
parties challenges it by filing an objection with the Board.76 If an objection
is filed, the NLRB or a three-member panel of the Board may review the
decision.77
After it issues an order, the NLRB can petition the court of appeals to
enforce the order.78 Any party harmed by an NLRB order may also petition
the court of appeals for judicial review.79 The courts show great deference
to NLRB decisions and will uphold an NLRB order unless it applied the
wrong legal standard, departed from precedent without providing a
justification, or was not supported by “substantial evidence on the
record.”80 The appeals court may enforce the order, modify the order, or
set it aside in whole or in part.81
Section 6 of the NLRA gives the NLRB statutory authority to
promulgate rules,82 and the Supreme Court has unanimously affirmed this
authority.83 A rule is an agency statement that interprets or implements the
law or establishes the procedural requirements of the agency.84 While the
complaint process is an adjudicatory process resulting in a specific order
for a specific set of facts that have occurred in the past, the rulemaking
process results in rules with more general applicability and prospective

75. Id.
76. Decide Cases, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/what-we-do/decide-cases [https://perma.cc/5BJV-4JUZ] (last visited Sept.
30, 2020).
77. Id.
78. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
79. Id.
80. Id.; Inova Health Sys. v. NLRB, 795 F.3d 68, 80 (2015). “Substantial
evidence on the record” means that the “record is so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Bally’s Park Place, Inc.
v. NLRB, 646 F.3d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
81. National Labor Relations Act § 10.
82. Id. § 6.
83. NLRB v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. 606 (1991), aff’g 899 F.2d 651 (7th
Cir. 1990).
84. Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the
Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 122 (1990).
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application.85 The Administrative Procedure Act governs the rulemaking
process and requires a notice and comment period on any proposed rules.86
Agencies have broad discretion to choose between using rulemaking
or adjudication.87 The Supreme Court recognized this discretion in SEC v.
Chenery but also urged agencies, where possible, to fill in the gaps in laws
“through th[e] quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the
future.”88 While there are limits to the NLRB’s ability to create policies
using adjudication, absent an abuse of discretion the NLRB has the choice
between creating policies through rulemaking or through adjudication.89
The NLRB has relied almost exclusively on case-by-case adjudication,
rather than rulemaking.90 Case-by-case adjudication allows the Board to
engage in more exploration of factual disputes and to make incremental
policy changes.91 Case-by-case adjudication has also led to significant
inconsistencies in outcomes because the Board frequently overrules prior
precedents, as it did in the General Motors LLC decision.92 These changes
to precedent are often attributable to changes in the party of the current
presidential administration and, consequently, the composition of NLRB
membership.93
Despite some inconsistencies in application, the NLRB’s enforcement
powers provide protection from adverse employment actions, including
termination, to employees who participate in Section 7 activities. In much
the same way, Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws protect
employees from adverse employment actions on the basis of certain
protected characteristics.
85. Id.
86. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); Mark H.
Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE
L.J. 274, 297 (1991).
87. Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking:
Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1469, 1473 (2015).
88. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
89. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (upholding
application of a rule-like policy announced in an adjudication but expressing
disapproval of the NLRB’s disregard of APA rulemaking procedures); NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (sustaining the NLRB’s application of
the “managerial employee” exemption to certain employees and reaffirming the
NLRB’s discretion in choosing between rulemaking and adjudication).
90. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 F.I.U. L.
REV. 411, 415 (2010).
91. Id. at 415–17.
92. Id.
93. See Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations
Board Revisited, 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 24, 31–32 (2014).
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B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Other Workplace
Antidiscrimination Laws
Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination in compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment based on race, sex, color, religion,
or national origin.94 The purpose of Title VII is to promote equality in
employment decisions by forcing employers to consider more objective
criteria rather than an employee’s race, gender, or other protected
characteristics.95 Congress selected the protected characteristics
incorporated into Title VII because those classes faced a history of unequal
treatment in the workplace.96 A party complaining of unlawful
discrimination may prove a violation of Title VII by showing disparate
treatment97 or disparate impact.98
Title VII also protects employees from harassment based on a
protected characteristic.99 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme
Court held that the prohibition on discrimination afforded employees “the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult.”100 Harassment that is so severe or pervasive that it
alters the conditions of employment and creates an abusive working
environment is known as a “hostile work environment.”101 An employer is
liable under Title VII if it fails to prevent even non-supervisory employees
from creating a hostile work environment.102 Title VII is not, however, a
94. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1).
95. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT.,
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/public-policy/hr-public-policy-issues/pages/title
viiofthecivilrightsactof1964.aspx [https://perma.cc/ER53-3TS2] (last visited Oct.
15, 2020).
96. Id.
97. “Disparate treatment” is defined as “[t]he practice, esp. in employment,
of intentionally dealing with persons differently because of their race, sex,
national origin, age, or disability. To succeed on a disparate-treatment claim, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent or
motive.” Disparate Treatment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98. “Disparate impact” is defined as “[t]he adverse effect of a facially neutral
practice (esp. an employment practice) that nonetheless discriminates against
persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability and that is not
justified by business necessity. Discriminatory intent is irrelevant in a disparateimpact claim.” Disparate Impact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
99. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
100. Id.
101. Ali v. McCarthy, 179 F. Supp. 3d 54, 64 (D.D.C. 2016).
102. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13.
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“general civility code”; Title VII does not prohibit all harassment in the
workplace, only discriminatory harassment based on one of the statute’s
protected characteristics.103
The NLRB’s review of cases involving discriminatory harassment
most often relates to Title VII, but there are other federal, state, and local
antidiscrimination laws that impose similar liability on employers.104 The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees solely due to their age.105 The
ADEA protects individuals who are age 40 or over, but individuals under
the age of 40 have no recourse under the act.106 The Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits discrimination against “qualified
individuals” with a disability.107 The ADA also requires employers to
make “reasonable accommodations” that would enable a disabled person
to perform the job.108 States are also increasingly adopting
antidiscrimination and antiharassment laws, sometimes imposing even
greater protections than federal law requires.109
C. Interaction NLRA and Antidiscrimination Laws
Employers are generally free to discharge employees for any
reason.110 The NLRA and antidiscrimination statutes provide some
protection against adverse actions to employees based on their
involvement in protected activity or on their protected characteristics. 111
Employers are obligated to comply with both the NLRA and
antidiscrimination statutes.112 These obligations sometimes conflict with
each other, especially because of past application of NLRB standards to
cases that involve employer obligations under both sets of laws.113
103. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
104. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13.
105. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
106. Id. § 12.
107. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A
“qualified individual” is one who can perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without a reasonable accommodation. Id. § 101(8).
108. Id.
109. Vann & Logan, supra note 13, at 301; see also 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-101–5/2-110 (West 2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12940–12952 (West
2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2018).
110. BOURDEAU & VAN ARSDALE, supra note 23.
111. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13.
112. Id. at 295.
113. Id.
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II. HISTORICAL NLRB STANDARDS APPLIED IN EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
CASES INVOLVING SECTION 7 PROTECTED ACTIVITIES
The NLRA provides some protection to employees engaging in
Section 7 protected activity, but the protection is not absolute.114 An
employer may not take an action against an employee because of the
employee’s participation in protected activity, but the employer may take
actions based on legitimate business needs, such as maintaining order or
dealing with underperformance.115 The NLRB must balance the rights of
employees with those of the employer, and the underlying motivation for
an adverse action is not always clear.116 To address the balancing of rights,
the NLRB adopted different standards to evaluate disciplinary actions in
(1) cases where the employer gave a pretextual reason for discipline that
was actually motivated by anti-union sentiment, (2) cases where an
employer had dual motives for disciplinary action, one legitimate and one
based on anti-union sentiment, and (3) cases in which an employer
disciplined an employee for misconduct that occurred during the course of
engaging in Section 7 protected activity.117
A. Pretextual Reasons for Discipline Motivated by Anti-Union Sentiment
An employer will rarely assert that it disciplined an employee due to
anti-union sentiment because to do so would be a clear violation of the
NLRA.118 Instead, an employer who disciplines an employee for no reason
other than their union support is likely to assert a legitimate business
reason119 as justification for the discipline.120 If an employer provides a
legitimate business reason as justification for an adverse action against an
employee, the Board will determine if the adverse action was actually
“discriminatorily motivated.”121 If there was a discriminatory motive, then
114. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 475
(1953).
115. BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 59.
116. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083–84 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
117. Id.; Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B 814 (1979).
118. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083.
119. An employer has a “legitimate business reason” to discharge an employee
for economic reasons or other cause, such as disobedience or underperformance.
BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 59.
120. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083–84.
121. W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 1978)
(finding that a “failure to investigate the incidents upon which the employer relies
as grounds for discharge may reflect an employer’s discriminatory motivation”).

360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd 245

11/19/21 12:01 PM

242

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

the reason given is pretextual and the disciplinary action is a violation of
the NLRA.122
B. Dual Motives for Discipline Partially Motivated by Anti-Union
Sentiment—The Wright Line Standard
In a dual-motive case, the discipline or discharge decision involves
both legitimate and illegitimate motives.123 The first motive is a legitimate
business reason, giving the employer “cause”124 for discipline, and the
second motive is the employer’s anti-union sentiment.125 The second
motive, in isolation, would be a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.126 In Wright Line, the NLRB considered the appropriate standard
to adopt when an employer demonstrated two motives for disciplining an
employee, one permissible and one impermissible under the NLRA.127
Wright Line terminated Bernard Lamoureaux, a leading union
advocate.128 Lamoureaux alleged that his union activity motivated the
termination—a violation of Section 8(a)(3).129 Wright Line alleged that
discrepancies in Lamoureaux’s timesheet motivated the termination—a
“legitimate business purpose.”130 Wright Line had employed Lamoureaux
for over ten years and considered him a “better than average employee.”131
When Lamoureaux’s supervisor Francis Forte discovered the discrepancy
in the timesheet, Forte reported it to his supervisor who then instructed
Forte to ask Lamoureaux for an explanation.132 Lamoureaux explained that
while he may not have performed the job at the precise time listed on his
timesheet, he did complete the job in that same day.133 Wright Line
rejected Lamoureaux’s explanation and discharged him, but records
revealed that Wright Line had already prepared Lamoureaux’s final
paycheck before the conversation with Forte occurred.134

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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In Wright Line, the NLRB adopted a burden-shifting framework to
evaluate whether a dual-motive disciplinary action violated the Act.135
First, the General Counsel must make a prima facie showing that protected
activity was a motivating factor in the discipline.136 If the General Counsel
succeeds, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of the employee’s involvement in
Section 7 protected activity.137 If the employer succeeds in showing that it
would have taken the same action, then the employer will prevail; if the
employer cannot demonstrate that it would have taken the same
disciplinary action in the absence of Section 7 activity, the employer’s
actions are a violation of 8(a)(3) and, derivatively, 8(a)(1).138
In Wright Line, the General Counsel established his prima facie case
by showing that the employee had become a leading union advocate and
supervisors referred to him as the “union kingpin.”139 The burden then
shifted to Wright Line to show that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of Lamoureaux’s union involvement.140 Wright Line could not
make this showing because it did not terminate other employees with
similar timesheet discrepancies.141 As a result, the NLRB found that the
discharge was a violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and
ordered Wright Line to reinstate Lamoureaux.142
C. Discipline for Misconduct During Section 7 Protected Activities
In cases where an employee engaged in misconduct during the course
of engaging in Section 7 protected activities, the NLRB applied different
standards depending on the specific setting of the conduct.143 Three
distinct settings have emerged: workplace discussions with management,
social media, and the picket line.144 These cases differ from dual-motive
cases because the conduct an employee engages in during protected
135. Id. at 1089.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1090.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1091.
142. Id.
143. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), 2020 WL 4193017, at *6.
144. Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B.
505 (2015), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc.,
268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
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activity is at issue, rather than a legitimate business reason that is distinct
from any protected activity.145
1. Misconduct During Management Discussions—The Atlantic Steel
Standard
When the conduct at issue occurred during otherwise protected
workplace conversations with management, the Board applied the fourfactor test from Atlantic Steel to determine if the employee lost the
protection of the Act due to the nature of his misconduct.146 In Atlantic
Steel, Kenneth Chastain, an employee of Atlantic Steel, approached his
supervisor in the production area with a question about the assignment of
overtime.147 After the foreman provided an explanation and began walking
away, Chastain turned to another employee and called the foreman a
“lying son of a bitch.”148 Atlantic Steel initially suspended Chastain for the
outburst and later terminated him.149
The Board laid out four factors to determine whether an employee’s
conduct loses the protection of the Act: “(1) the place of the discussion;
(2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s
outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was . . . provoked by an . . . unfair
labor practice.”150 The Board indicated that the Act is less likely to protect
conduct occurring in the work area during work time than conduct
occurring during grievance meetings or other meetings between the union
and management.151 In Atlantic Steel, the NLRB ultimately found that
Chastain lost the protection of the Act because the outburst occurred on
the production floor, outside of the available grievance process, and was
obscene and unprovoked.152
145. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1091; Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814.
For example, if an employee is terminated for calling his boss a “fucking moron”
during a meeting between the union and management over working conditions, it
would be misconduct occurring during Section 7 protected activity. If an
employee is terminated in part because he is active in a union and in part because
he called his boss a “fucking moron” for supporting a different football team, it
would be analyzed as a dual-motive case, because the misconduct itself had
nothing to do with concerted activity.
146. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *6.
147. Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 814.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 816.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 816–17.

360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd 248

11/19/21 12:01 PM

2021]

COMMENT

245

The NLRB has further explained the application of the Atlantic Steel
factors in subsequent cases.153 Under the first factor, the NLRB
distinguishes between incidents that occur in a private setting away from
other employees and those that occur in the presence of other employees,
with private discussions weighing further in favor of protection.154 Under
the third factor, obscene, profane, personal attacks weigh against the
protection of the NLRA, but they do not automatically result in loss of the
Act’s protection.155 In cases where the employee used profanity in an
outburst, the Board is more likely to protect profanity used to describe a
policy than profanity directed at an individual.156 While the Board used the
Atlantic Steel framework for discussions that occurred between the union
and management, it declined to extend the standard to conduct that
occurred in other settings, such as the picket line and social media.157
2. Misconduct During Conversations on Social Media
In instances where an employee engaged in otherwise protected
conduct during social media discussions, the NLRB evaluated whether the
employee’s conduct lost the protection of the NLRA under a totality of the
circumstances approach.158 For example, in Pier Sixty, employees of a
catering company were campaigning to form a union.159 Two days before
the union election, Hernan Perez, a thirteen-year employee, was working
at a catered event when his supervisor belittled him and other employees
in front of the guests.160 Perez was frustrated, and during a break posted to
Facebook on his personal page: “Bob is such a NASTY MOTHER
FUCKER don’t know how to talk to people . . . Vote YES for the
153. See Plaza Auto Ctr. (Plaza Auto I), 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014).
154. Id. at 978.
155. Id. at 977.
156. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 796, 807–08 (2004)). In
Wal-Mart Stores, an employee did not lose the protection of the Act by describing
a method of measuring as “bullshit.” Wal-Mart Stores, 341 N.L.R.B. 796. In
contrast, the employee of Plaza Auto Center called the vice-president a “stupid
fucking moron,” which weighed the “nature of the outburst” factor against
protection of the Act. Plaza Auto I, 360 N.L.R.B. 972.
157. See Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 505–06 (2015), enforced, 855
F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046
(1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
158. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), 2020 WL 4193017, at *9.
159. Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 505.
160. Id.
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UNION!!!!!!!”161 Pier Sixty discharged Perez about two weeks later
because of the Facebook post.162
Because Perez’s Facebook post expressed support for the union
election, Section 7 protected that part of the message, and the Board had
to determine whether Perez’s profane attack on his supervisor caused the
message to lose the protection of the Act.163 The Board used a totality of
the circumstances approach and found that Perez had not lost the
protection of the Act.164 Relevant circumstances included evidence of the
employer’s anti-union hostility, the location and subject matter of the post,
whether the employer tolerated similar conduct in the workplace, and
whether the employer used the same level of discipline for similar
offenses.165 In cases regarding disparaging or disloyal remarks about the
company or its products on social media or to third persons, the Board
applied a separate test, asking whether an employee’s efforts to improve
wages or working conditions were “pursued in a reasonable manner under
the circumstances.”166
3. Misconduct on the Picket Line—The Clear Pine Mouldings
Standard
In cases of misconduct on the picket line, the NLRB applied the Clear
Pine Mouldings standard.167 Shortly after a strike at Clear Pine Mouldings,
Inc. began, Rodney Sittser, a striking employee, flagged down the car of
an employee who was not striking and told her that “she was taking her

161. Id.
162. Id. at 506.
163. See id. at 505–06.
164. Id. at 506.
165. In Pier Sixty, the Board considered:
(1) whether the record contained any evidence of the Respondent's antiunion hostility; (2) whether the Respondent provoked Perez’ conduct;
(3) whether Perez’ conduct was impulsive or deliberate; (4) the location
of Perez’ Facebook post; (5) the subject matter of the post; (6) the nature
of the post; (7) whether the Respondent considered language similar to
that used by Perez to be offensive; (8) whether the employer maintained
a specific rule prohibiting the language at issue; and (9) whether the
discipline imposed upon Perez was typical of that imposed for similar
violations or disproportionate to his offense.
Id.
166. Sierra Publ’g Co. v. N.L.R.B., 889 F.2d 210, 220 (1989).
167. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), 2020 WL 4193017, at *10.
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life in her hands by crossing the picket line and would live to regret it.”168
The remarks frightened the woman, and she began taking alternate routes
to work.169 In a separate incident, Robert Anderson was on the picket line
during a shift change and used a club to beat at the vehicles of non-striking
employees as they were leaving work.170 He told one employee, “I am
going to kill you, you son-of-a-bitch.”171
In previous decisions, the NLRB held that verbal threats “‘not
accompanied by any physical acts or gestures that would provide added
emphasis or meaning to [the] words,’ do not constitute serious strike
misconduct warranting an employer’s refusal to reinstate the strikers.”172
In Clear Pine Mouldings, however, the Board rejected this standard
because an abusive threat not accompanied by any physical acts or
gestures may still amount to “restraint and coercion” prohibited elsewhere
in the NLRA.173 Instead, the NLRB adopted the Third Circuit’s test: an
employee’s conduct on the picket line loses the protection of the Act when
the employee’s conduct “may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate
employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act.”174 In its
decision, the Board explicitly rejected a balancing test weighing the
gravity of management’s unfair labor practices against the gravity of the
employee’s misconduct and stated that it will deny reinstatement and
backpay to employees who “exceed the bounds of peaceful and reasoned
conduct.”175 Using this standard, the Board denied reinstatement to the
picketing employees, because their actions tended to coerce and intimidate
other employees who were exercising their right to not participate in the
strike.176
The NLRB’s use of three separate standards depending on the setting
of the conduct complicated the analysis of employers’ discipline of
employee misconduct.177 Although determining the setting of conduct may
be straight-forward, employers, unions, employees, and judges must be
168. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1044–45 (1984),
enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
169. Id. at 1045.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973)).
173. Id. at 1046; National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
174. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046 (quoting NLRB v. W.C.
McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 1977)).
175. Id. at 1047.
176. Id.
177. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), 2020 WL 4193017, at *6.
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familiar with three separate standards in order to correctly apply the law.178
In addition, the NLRB has frequently applied these standards in a way that
potentially conflicts with employer obligations under Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws.179
D. Conflict Between Existing NLRB Standards and Title VII
Employers face a difficult choice when confronted with instances of
possibly illegal harassment perpetrated during the course of Section 7
protected activities: investigate the incident and discipline the employee
and open the company up to sanctions from the NLRB, or avoid
disciplining the harassing employee and face potential liability under Title
VII or other antidiscrimination laws.180 An employee could make racist or
sexual comments while engaging in Section 7 protected activity, and the
speech may be protected, meaning discipline would violate the NLRA. 181
Meanwhile, failing to take any disciplinary action may subject the
employer to liability for racial or sexual discrimination claims.182 Even if
a single instance of conduct or speech does not create a hostile work
environment,183 the employer’s ability to investigate it and take corrective
action is essential to avoid a pattern of behavior that does create a hostile
work environment and opens the employer up to liability.184
Under the setting-specific standards, the NLRB issued several
decisions that conflict with Title VII’s goal of ending workplace
harassment.185 In Airo Die Casting, the NLRB applied the holding of Clear
Pine Mouldings to protect the use of racial slurs.186 An employee of Airo
Die Casting, Ronald Lawson, was participating in a picket of the company
and yelled “fuck you n[-----]” at a Black security guard who was leaving
the site.187 Airo Die Casting discharged Lawson as a result of the

178. Id.
179. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13.
180. Id.
181. Michael Green, The Audacity of Protecting Racist Speech Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 235, 248 (2017).
182. Id.
183. Harassment that is so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of
employment creates a hostile work environment. Ali v. McCarthy, 179 F. Supp.
3d 54, 64 (D.D.C. 2016).
184. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13, at 294.
185. Id. at 292.
186. Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 810 (2006).
187. Id. at 811.
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incident.188 The NLRB did not find that the conduct was accompanied by
threats or coercion, and, under the Clear Pines Moulding standard, the
employee did not lose the protection of the NLRA.189
The NLRB had another opportunity to examine this issue in its 2016
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. decision.190 While on strike at Cooper Tire,
Anthony Runion yelled racially offensive remarks at a van of mostly Black
replacement workers.191 Cooper Tire terminated Runion the following
week for his statements on the picket line.192 The NLRB found that while
Runion’s statements were “racist and offensive,” they did not “tend to
coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights,”
and Runion did not lose the protection of the NLRA.193
Scholars and business groups were critical of the setting-specific
standards that the NLRB adopted, primarily because of the inherent
conflict with an employer’s responsibilities under Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws.194 The courts have also shown skepticism toward
the approach for similar reasons.195 In a concurring opinion, one federal
circuit court judge referred to the NLRB’s approach to sexually and
racially offensive conduct as “cavalier and enabling” and noted that this
type of conduct is “illegal in every other corner of the workplace.”196 Judge
Millett recognized that rough words may arise in the tense environment
surrounding a workplace strike but argued that racially or sexually
motivated conduct should be unacceptable.197 Recognizing the conflicts
between the NLRA and Title VII, the NLRB and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission announced in 2017 that they would cooperate
with each other to publish guidance for employers, but they never issued
188. Id.
189. Id. at 812.
190. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13, at 295.
191. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (Cooper Tire I), 2015 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
178146, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), adopted as
modified, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (May 17, 2016), 2016 WL 2894792, enforced,
866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Green, supra note 181; see Vann & Logan, supra note 13; Brief
for Association of Corporate Counsel as Amicus Curiae, Gen. Motors LLC
(General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21, 2020) (No. 14-CA-197985),
2020 WL 4193017.
195. See, e.g., Consol. Commc’ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (Millett, J., concurring).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 21.
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this guidance.198 It is against this backdrop that the NLRB heard the
General Motors LLC case.
III. GENERAL MOTORS LLC—THE NLRB OVERRULES THE SETTINGSPECIFIC STANDARDS
In July 2020, the NLRB issued its decision in General Motors LLC.199
The Board overruled its previous line of cases that determined when an
employee’s abusive or discriminatory conduct occurring during the course
of Section 7 activities would lose the protection of the NLRA.200 As a
result of this decision, the Board will no longer apply Atlantic Steel, Clear
Pine Mouldings, or the totality of the circumstances standards to employee
discipline involving “abusive conduct.”201 This decision resolves the
conflict between the NLRA and antidiscrimination laws and simplifies the
number of standards involved in discipline cases.202 At the same time, the
Board’s definition of “abusive conduct” is ambiguous, and an expansive
reading would erode workers’ rights.203
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Charles Robinson worked as a union committeeperson at a General
Motors assembly plant in Kansas City, Kansas.204 In 2017, General Motors
suspended Robinson following three separate incidents of profane or
racially insensitive comments, all of which occurred during the course of
union activity.205 The first instance was an argument with a manager,
Anthony Stevens, about overtime coverage for cross-training employees
that became heated and ended with Robinson telling the manager to “shove
it up [his] fuckin’ ass.”206 The second exchange took place at a regular
meeting between the union and management over subcontracting: after
Stevens told Robinson he was talking too loudly, Robinson began acting
like a “caricature of a slave” and calling Stevens “Master Anthony.”207 In
the final incident, during another manpower meeting, Robinson told
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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Stevens that he would “mess [Stevens] up.”208 Robinson continued to
disrupt the meeting by playing loud music with offensive lyrics for
somewhere between ten and thirty minutes.209 These incidents resulted in
suspension for three days, two weeks, and thirty days, respectively.210
Robinson filed charges with the NLRB on May 3, 2017, and October
19, 2017.211 The General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that General
Motors violated the NLRA by disciplining Robinson with the three
suspensions while he was “engaged in protected activity on behalf of the
Union.”212 General Motors denied violating the NLRA, arguing that
Robinson’s conduct lost the protection of the Act.213 On September 18,
2018, the Administrative Law Judge issued her decision, applying the
Atlantic Steel standard to determine whether Robinson’s conduct while
engaged in union activity lost the protection of the NLRA.214
Under the Atlantic Steel framework, the Administrative Law Judge
determined that General Motors violated the NLRA for the discipline
issued in response to the first incident, in which Robinson told the manager
to “shove it up [his] fuckin’ ass.”215 The Administrative Law Judge
concluded that the Atlantic Steel factors favored protection because
Robinson was acting in his capacity as a union committeeperson regarding
his honest belief that the supervisor had violated an agreement with the
union and because the conversation took place in the managers’ office
area.216 For the second and third suspensions, the place of the incidents (a
closed-door meeting between the union and management) and the subject
matter (terms and conditions of employment and manpower) weighed in
favor of protection.217 The nature of the outbursts and the absence of an
unfair labor practice provoking the outbursts weighed against
protection.218 Balancing these factors, the Administrative Law Judge
concluded that Robinson had lost the protection of the NLRA, and
consequently, the second and third suspensions did not violate the Act.219
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id. at *2–3.
211. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors I), No. 14-CA-197985, 2018 WL
4489341 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 18, 2018).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *3.
215. General Motors I, 2018 WL 4489341.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id.
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After the General Counsel filed an exception, the NLRB issued an
Invitation to File Briefs220 on September 5, 2019.221 The NLRB invited the
parties and interested amici to file briefs in response to five questions,
largely dealing with how much leeway Section 7 should give employees
when using profane language or racially or sexually offensive speech
while engaging in Section 7 activity.222 Twenty amici filed briefs,
including unions, management groups, and law firms.223 Following review
of the parties’ and amici’s briefs, the NLRB issued its decision, overruling
the prior setting-specific standards.
B. The NLRB Decision
In its decision, the NLRB explained its concerns with the previous
setting-specific standards.224 First, the NLRB stated that the application of
the previous standards yielded unpredictable results.225 Second, the NLRB
recognized the conflict between employers’ obligations under Title VII
and other antidiscrimination laws.226
After considering the exceptions and briefs filed by the parties and
amici, the NLRB overruled its prior setting-specific standards and
announced that it will now apply its Wright Line burden-shifting
framework “to cases involving abusive conduct in connection with activity
protected by” the NLRA.227 Under this framework, the General Counsel
must first show: “(1) the employee engaged in Section 7 activity, (2) the
220. In significant cases, the NLRB occasionally invites the public to file
amicus briefs. The Board maintains a list of invitations on its website with filing
deadlines and short descriptions of the issues. Invitation to File Briefs, NAT’L
LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/filing/invitations-to-filebriefs [https://perma.cc/9BK6-ENG3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
221. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), 2020 WL 4193017, at *3.
222. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors III), 368 N.L.R.B No. 68 (Sept. 5,
2019), 2019 WL 4240696, at *2–3 (notice and invitation to file briefs).
223. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *4.
224. Id. at *1.
225. Id. The Board noted examples of inconsistent results. In DaimlerChrysler
the Board found that an employee lost the protection of the Act for calling his
supervisor an “asshole” and saying that he didn’t “have to put up with this
bullshit.” Id. at *8 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1324 (2005)).
The Board then cited Postal Service and Plaza Auto as examples of cases with
more egregious conduct where the Board nevertheless found the employees had
not lost the protection of the Act. Id.
226. Id. at *1.
227. Id.
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employer knew of that activity, and (3) the employer had animus against
the Section 7 activity.”228 If the General Counsel establishes a prima facie
case, then the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of Section 7 protected activity.229 The
NLRB remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for further
proceedings consistent with the decision.230 Following remand, the NLRB
filed a dismissal letter after the General Counsel determined that he could
not establish a prima facie case under the Wright Line standard.231
C. The Shortcomings of the NLRB Decision
Although the General Motors LLC decision took a positive step by
refusing to continue to protect egregious racially or sexually offensive
conduct, the decision left two major questions unanswered.232 First, the
Board did not define the scope of “abusive conduct” that now triggers the
Wright Line analysis.233 Second, the Board did not decide the appropriate
standard for conduct that falls short of abusive.234
1. What Is Abusive Conduct?
The General Motors LLC decision applies to “abusive conduct in
connection with activity protected by Section 7.”235 The Board did not
provide a definition or test for “abusive conduct” in its decision, although
it did specifically reference “profane ad hominem attack[s] or racial
slur[s].”236 In addition, the NLRB discussed previous cases as examples of
“abusive conduct.”237 Calling the owner of the company a “fucking crook”
and “asshole” and calling a supervisor a “NASTY MOTHER FUCKER”
228. Id. at *15.
229. Id. at *16.
230. Id. at *5.
231. The General Counsel’s office filed a motion on October 21, 2020, stating
that after further investigation, he was unable to meet his prima facie case under
Wright Line and asking that the case be remanded to the Acting Regional Director
so the complaint could be withdrawn. The NLRB filed a dismissal letter on
November 16, 2021. General Motors LLC, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/14-CA-197985 [https://perma.cc/4JXY-TDCD] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2020).
232. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. Id. at *1.
236. Id. at *13.
237. Id.
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were examples of “profane ad hominem attacks.”238 A statement regarding
“fried chicken and watermelon” in reference to Black replacement workers
was an example of a racial slur.239
There is no statutory definition of “abusive conduct” in the NLRA.240
Some circuit courts have recognized that “abusive conduct” is not
protected by the NLRA but have not defined the term.241 In the Title VII
context, the Supreme Court described “abusive conduct” in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. as “behavior so objectively offensive
as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.”242 The Court’s
description of “abusive conduct” in Oncale appears to be a much narrower
definition of “abusive conduct” than the NLRB’s.243 Not every profane ad
hominem attack implicates a characteristic protected by antidiscrimination
laws, and even racially or sexually offensive statements may not be severe
enough to alter the conditions of employment.244 The Oncale decision,
however, is not directly applicable to unfair labor practice complaints, 245
and the NLRB did not indicate that it was adopting this definition in its
decision.246
It is not clear from the NLRB’s definition of “abusive conduct”
whether each incident at issue in General Motors LLC was “abusive
conduct” or whether the sum of the incidents was “abusive,” because the
NLRB remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge without
deciding that question.247 In the first incident, Robinson told his manager
to “shove it up [his] fuckin’ ass,” which is not a racially or sexually
offensive statement or an ad hominem attack.248 The NLRB did not intend

238. Id. at *1 nn.1–2.
239. Id. at *1 n.3.
240. See 29 U.S.C. § 152.
241. See OPW Fueling Components v. NLRB, 443 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2006);
Roadmaster Corp. v. NLRB, 874 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1989); Plaza Auto Ctr. Inc.,
v. NLRB (Plaza Auto II), 664 F.3d 286 (9th Cir. 2011).
242. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S 75, 81 (1998).
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. The Oncale decision considered what conduct created a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII, and the Court did not need to consider a
broader definition of “abusive conduct” outside of the Title VII context. Id.
246. See id.; Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127
(July 21, 2020), 2020 WL 4193017.
247. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *13.
248. Id., 2020 WL 4193017, at *2. The second incident, in which Robinson
began acting as a “caricature of a slave” and calling his manager “Master
Anthony,” may fall under the definition of “abusive conduct” as a “racial slur.”
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to classify all types of misconduct as “abusive conduct,” noting that
“[since the] decision only addresses abusive conduct, precedent on
disparagement or disloyalty is beyond its scope.”249 By failing to define
“abusive conduct,” the NLRB added to the complexity and uncertainty
surrounding conduct protected by the NLRA.250
2. What Standard Applies to Non-Abusive Misconduct?
The NLRB recognized in the General Motors decision that certain
types of employee misconduct do not fall under “abusive conduct” but did
not suggest an applicable standard for those cases in the future.251 The
NLRB only overruled Atlantic Steel, Clear Pine Mouldings, and the
totality of the circumstances approach in social media cases “to the extent
they are inconsistent with” its holding that it will now review “abusive
conduct” under Wright Line.252 This suggests that the setting-specific
standards may still apply to conduct that is not “abusive” under General
Motors, but the Board did not explicitly state this conclusion.253 The
absence of clarity over the correct standard to apply to instances of nonabusive misconduct will make it more difficult for employers, unions, and
Administrative Law Judges to argue and issue decisions in these cases in
the future.254
IV. CLARIFYING THE SCOPE AND TREATMENT OF ABUSIVE AND NONABUSIVE CONDUCT DURING SECTION 7 PROTECTED ACTIVITIES
The ambiguous language of the General Motors LLC decision means
there is a risk that the NLRB will apply it inconsistently in the future. 255
The recent change in the political composition of the Board resulting from
the Biden administration’s recent appointments is also likely to result in a

The NLRB was not reviewing the decision relating to the third incident in which
Robinson disrupted a meeting by playing loud, offensive music.
249. Id. at *9 n.16.
250. Philip Miscimarra et al., INSIGHT: NLRB Finally Limits Protection of
Abusive, Profane, Offensive Conduct, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 6, 2020, 3:01 AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBMEB8CO000000
[https://perma.cc/CX2Z-68MS].
251. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *9 n.16.
252. Id. at *1.
253. See id.
254. See Miscimarra, supra note 250.
255. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *1; see Garden, supra note 87.

360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd 259

11/19/21 12:01 PM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

256

[Vol. 82

change in approach.256 To provide clarity to employers, unions, and
Administrative Law Judges, the NLRB should adopt a clear definition for
“abusive conduct” and clarify what standard should apply to non-abusive
conduct. To avoid increasing the complexity of the analysis in these cases,
the Board should consider consolidating the setting-specific
frameworks257 into one standard.
A. Creating a Test for “Abusive Conduct”
While certain conduct is so severe that it should lose the protection of
the Act, courts recognize that “not every impropriety committed during
[Section 7 protected] activity places the employee beyond the protective
shield of the act.”258 Any test for “abusive conduct” should distinguish
between conduct that is severe enough to lose protection and conduct that
is merely improper.259 The NLRB should adopt a test for “abusive
conduct” that encompasses conduct that employers are legally obligated
to restrict but excludes other types of misconduct, such as profanity and
insults.
1. Conduct That Is Racially or Sexually Offensive
Some amici in General Motors LLC argued that there does not need
to be any change to the application of the setting-specific frameworks to
racially or sexually offensive conduct in the course of protected activity.260
These amici argued that the existing frameworks are adequate to address
this type of conduct.261 The NLRB decisions in Cooper Tire and Airo Die

256. In August, the U.S. Senate confirmed two new members of the NLRB,
giving Democrats control of the Board for the first time since 2016. Daniel
Wiessner & David Shepardson, U.S. Senate Approves Union Lawyers to NLRB,
Giving Democrats Control, REUTERS (July 28, 2021, 7:17 PM), https://www
.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/senate-approves-union-lawyer-wilcox-nlrb-seat2021-07-28/ [https://perma.cc/2ZJZ-DYNN].
257. The setting-specific frameworks are the Atlantic Steel framework for
discussions between the union and management, totality of the circumstances for
social media discussions, and the Clear Pine Mouldings standard for the picket
line.
258. NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965).
259. See id.
260. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *5 n.12.
261. See, e.g., Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 12, General Motors II,
2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985); Brief for National Nurses United as
Amicus Curiae at 4, General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985);
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Casting demonstrate, however, that the setting-specific frameworks do not
adequately address racially and sexually offensive conduct.262 In each of
these cases, the NLRB ordered employers to reinstate employees who
made racially offensive statements because they did not consider the
statements to be threatening or coercive.263
It was appropriate for the NLRB to lower the protection afforded to
racially or sexually offensive conduct by applying the Wright Line
standard, because this type of conduct is categorically different from
profanity, insults, and other types of misconduct.264 Racially and sexually
motivated conduct “conveys a message of exclusion, defamation, and
intimidation to a blanket group, rather than addressing a particular
grievance in the workplace.”265 Speech that targets people because of their
race or gender is valueless and has a serious impact on those at whom it is
directed.266 Furthermore, allowing an employer to discipline an employee
who engages in this type of conduct resolves the conflict with the
employer’s obligations under Title VII.267 Therefore, in future applications
of General Motors LLC, the Board should continue to include racially and
sexually offensive conduct in the definition of “abusive conduct.”
2. Other Conduct That Increases Employer Liability Under
Applicable Employment Laws
While the NLRB only specifically lists racially and sexually offensive
speech as examples of “abusive conduct” that are discriminatory in nature,
Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws protect many characteristics
beyond race and sex.268 The main rationale for the NLRB’s decision to
analyze “abusive conduct” under Wright Line is to account for an
Brief for Communications Workers of America as Amicus Curiae at 6, General
Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985).
262. Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 810 (2006); Cooper Tire & Rubber
Co. (Cooper Tire II), 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (May 17, 2016), 2016 WL 2894792.
263. Airo Die Casting, 347 N.L.R.B. at 813; Cooper Tire II, 2016 WL
2894792, at *1.
264. Carly Thelan, Hate Speech as Protected Conduct: Reworking the
Approach to Offensive Speech Under the NLRA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1000
(2019).
265. Id. at 1000–01.
266. Id. at 1009.
267. Id. at 1001.
268. Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), 2020 WL 4193017, at *13; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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employer’s obligations under Title VII.269 This rationale extends to other
protected characteristics under Title VII and other statutory schemes.270
Since offensive comments based on a co-worker’s age, disability,
nationality, or religion would create similar liabilities for an employer as
comments based on race and gender, the NLRB should also treat these
types of comments as “abusive conduct” under the General Motors LLC
decision.271 A flexible standard that encompasses any conduct that an
employer has a direct legal obligation to prevent will adapt to varying local
legislation and any federal expansion of statutory protections in the
future.272 This may mean that “abusive conduct” would include certain
conduct in some states and localities and not in others.273 This standard
would not add complexity for employers or unions, however, since they
should already be aware of and in compliance with any local statutory
requirements.274 “Abusive conduct” that triggers the Wright Line analysis
should be narrowly construed to only apply to conduct that creates liability
for the employer under other legislation and should not extend to other
forms of misconduct.
3. Conduct That Is Merely Profane or Insulting
The NLRB should not expand the definition of “abusive conduct” to
include merely profane or insulting language; nor should it retain “profane
ad hominem” attacks, without more, as part of the definition. The main
rationale behind the NLRB’s decision to abandon Atlantic Steel and the
other setting-specific standards was the resulting tension with
antidiscrimination laws.275 However, Title VII is not a “general civility
code” and only prohibits harassment that is based on a protected
characteristic.276 Therefore, profanity or insults without racial or sexual
content, or content based on other protected characteristics, do not create
liability under Title VII or other antidiscrimination laws.277 It is only when

269. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *11.
270. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703; Age
Discrimination in Employment Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a).
271. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *11.
272. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13, at 292.
273. See id. at 301–02.
274. See id.
275. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *1.
276. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
277. See id.
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there is conflict with other statutory protections that the Act should afford
less protection to employees exercising their Section 7 rights.278
Subjecting profane and insulting language to the Wright Line analysis
rather than the setting-specific standards that previously existed will
curtail employee rights under the NLRA.279 The NLRB and courts have
historically been more protective of rude or emotional outbursts made in
the course of a labor dispute because emotions tend to run high in those
circumstances.280 Disputes concerning pay and working conditions may
elicit strong responses, and the protection of the Act would be hollow if
the NLRB did not recognize this reality.281 Uncensored comments are
necessary for the posturing that is inherent in labor relations and can
redress the imbalance of power that exists between employers and
employees.282
Placing constraints on the language that may be used—even profane
and insulting language—would undermine the bargaining process by
unbalancing the power in the union-management relationship.283 After all,
an employee has “no parallel method of retaliation” if the employer uses
profane or insulting language.284 As the NLRB noted in Bettcher
Manufacturing, its seminal decision on the use of offensive and insulting
statements in collective bargaining, if employers could discipline
employees because they resented statements made during bargaining,
either “collective bargaining would cease to be between equals . . . or
employees would hesitate ever to participate.”285 Applying Wright Line
would have a chilling effect on employee participation in Section 7
protected activity by removing more employee conduct from the
protection of the Act.286
Previous Boards have used the setting-specific standards for conduct
occurring during Section 7 activity because they viewed the Section 7
activity as “analytically inseparable” from the conduct in these cases, but

278. See Consol. Commc’ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(Millett, J., concurring).
279. See McDermott, supra note 21, at 6.
280. Runyan & Kato, supra note 10, at 35.
281. Plaza Auto Ctr. (Plaza Auto I), 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 (2014).
282. Christine Neylon O’Brien, I Swear! From Shoptalk to Social Media: The
Top Ten National Labor Relations Board Profanity Cases, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
53, 56 (2016).
283. See McDermott, supra note 21.
284. Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948).
285. Id.
286. See id.; McDermott, supra note 21.
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the Wright Line analysis requires two distinct motives.287 For example, the
Seventh Circuit found in Thor Power Tool Co. that a “remark cannot be
considered in a vacuum,” and in some cases, a remark may “furnish[] the
excuse rather than the reason” for a disciplinary action.288 In the General
Motors decision, the current Board rejected the idea that Section 7 activity
is “analytically inseparable” from abusive conduct.289 The NLRB found it
plausible that, in the cases it examined, the employer disciplined the
employees entirely for their conduct and not for their union activity.290
Advocates for removing profane and insulting language from the
protection of the NLRA argue that employees have other means of voicing
their frustrations.291 This view ignores the confrontational nature of
collective bargaining.292 Negotiations are intended to implement a longterm employer-employee relationship, and this requires “[a] frank, and not
always complimentary, exchange.”293 In passing the NLRA, Congress
intended to encourage open debate between labor and management, and
permitted the use of blunt and profane language from representatives of
both labor and management.294 Retaining a higher level of protection for
misconduct that does not create potential employer liability under
antidiscrimination laws will allow employees to continue to effectively
voice workplace concerns without conflicting with other statutory
obligations of the employer.295
B. Consolidation of the Setting-Specific Standards for Non-Abusive,
Protected Conduct
Continued application of all of the setting-specific standards to
conduct that is not abusive would result in an additional layer of analysis
287. “The Board has explained, ‘Where an employer defends disciplinary
action based on employee conduct that is part of the res gestae of the employee’s
protected activity, Wright Line is inapplicable. This is because the causal
connection between the protected activity and the discipline is not in dispute.’”
Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21, 2020),
2020 WL 4193017, at *15 (citing Roemer Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B 828, 834 n.15
(2015)).
288. NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 586–87 (7th Cir. 1965).
289. General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *15.
290. Id. at *12.
291. See, e.g., Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amicus Curiae at 21, General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985).
292. O’Brien, supra note 282.
293. Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948).
294. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272 (1974).
295. See O’Brien, supra note 282.
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in cases where employers discipline employees for misconduct that occurs
during the course of a protected activity.296 Before determining which
standard to apply, an Administrative Law Judge would first have to decide
whether the conduct was abusive.297 If the conduct was abusive, the judge
would apply the Wright Line burden-shifting framework.298 If the conduct
was not abusive, the judge would have to determine the relevant standard
based on the setting of the conduct.299 The NLRB should consolidate the
setting-specific standards into one test and apply Atlantic Steel300 to
workplace discussions with management, social media discussions, and
the picket line.301 This consolidation will simplify the number of standards
applied to employee misconduct while maintaining a higher level of
protection for conduct that occurs while engaging in protected activity.
1. Maintaining the Atlantic Steel Framework for Workplace
Discussions with Management
Atlantic Steel provides a useable framework for conduct occurring in
the workplace.302 The Atlantic Steel standard acknowledges human
fallibility and balances the employee’s right to engage in concerted
activity with the employer’s right to maintain order.303 The NLRA protects
the subject matter of employee statements, while the manner of expression
determines whether the employee should lose that protection.304 The
question in each instance is whether the outburst is so unconscionable that
it should no longer be protected.305 Whether the conduct is so egregious
that it loses the protection of the Act depends not only on what was said,
296. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Atlantic Steel would apply to conduct occurring in meetings with
management, Clear Pine Mouldings would apply to conduct on the picket line,
and the totality of the circumstances approach would apply to social media and
other conversations that occurred outside of the workplace.
300. The Atlantic Steel four-factor test considers (1) the place of the
discussion, (2) the subject matter of the discussion, (3) the nature of the
employee’s outburst, and (4) whether the outburst was provoked by an unfair
labor practice.
301. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *6.
302. Brief for National Nurses United as Amicus Curiae at 4, General Motors
II, 2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985).
303. Id.
304. Brief for Communications Workers of America as Amicus Curiae at 6,
General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985).
305. Id.
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but also on the context in which it was said.306 Atlantic Steel allows for the
fact-specific analysis necessary to evaluate both the content of what was
said and the context in which it was said.307
There are legitimate reasons why employers want to prohibit the use
of profanity and other insulting language in their businesses, but Atlantic
Steel adequately addresses these reasons.308 One reason for limiting
profanity is that employers do not want to lose control of employee
behavior.309 The Atlantic Steel framework adequately addresses this
concern by considering the privacy of the conversation, providing more
protection to conversations that occur in private than those occurring on
the shop floor.310 Another reason for limiting profanity is to preserve the
image of the company, especially in a retail setting where customers may
be present.311 The courts and the NLRB have already recognized that
Atlantic Steel is inappropriate for outbursts that occur in front of customers
and use the Wright Line analysis in those cases.312 Therefore, outbursts in
front of customers do not need to be categorized as “abusive conduct”
under General Motors LLC in order to allow employers to effectively deal
with those incidents.313 Allowing some leeway for obscene or insulting
conduct during the course of protected activity promotes the NLRA’s goal
of protecting an employee’s right to engage in concerted activity, and the
NLRB can balance this right under existing standards without impeding
an employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining order in the workplace.314
2. Adapting the Atlantic Steel Framework to Social Media
Discussions
Cases involving employee conduct on social media are relatively
recent.315 In 2011, the Acting General Counsel of the NLRB issued a
306. Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 12, General Motors II, 2020 WL
4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985).
307. Brief for American Federation of Teachers as Amicus Curiae at 10,
General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017 (No. 14-CA-197985).
308. See O’Brien, supra note 282, at 58.
309. Id.
310. Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B 814 (1979).
311. See O’Brien, supra note 282.
312. Id. at 72.
313. See id.
314. Plaza Auto Ctr. (Plaza Auto I), 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 (2014).
315. See Elizabeth Allen, You Can’t Say That on Facebook: The NLRA’s
Opprobriousness Standard and Social Media, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 195
(2014).
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memorandum suggesting a modified Atlantic Steel analysis that
considered disruption to workplace discipline and disparagement of the
employer’s products.316 Some Administrative Law Judges also utilized
Atlantic Steel in early decisions on social media discussions.317 In 2015,
the NLRB rejected the adaptation of Atlantic Steel to social media posts
and adopted a totality of the circumstances approach instead.318 Despite
the NLRB rejection, the Board can eliminate the totality of the
circumstances approach and adapt Atlantic Steel for use in social media
cases by modifying the first factor.319
The first Atlantic Steel factor, “the place of the discussion,” must be
modified for application to social media posts.320 The physical location of
employees is less impactful when they post something to social media than
when they engage in a face-to-face discussion with management in the
workplace.321 The impact of a social media post depends more on what
platform it was shared on, whether it was public or private, and whether
the employer or coworkers were tagged than on whether the employee
made the post from home, the workplace, or somewhere else.322 In the
social media context, “the place of the discussion” factor must encompass
both the amount of disruption to the workplace, as is done in the traditional
Atlantic Steel application, as well as the public nature of the post.323
Because the Atlantic Steel framework favors conduct that occurs in private
due to its less disruptive nature,324 when adapted to social media this factor
should weigh more in favor of protection for posts that are shared privately
and visible only to friends than for posts that are made public or in which
the employer is named or tagged.325
The NLRB does not need to modify the remaining Atlantic Steel
factors—the subject matter of the discussion, the nature of the outburst,
and whether an unfair labor practice provoked it—in order to apply them

316. Id. at 208–09.
317. Id.
318. See Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 506 (2015), enforced, 855 F.3d
115 (2d Cir. 2017).
319. See Allen, supra note 315, at 209.
320. Id.
321. See James Long, #Fired: The National Labor Relations Act and
Employee Outbursts in the Age of Social Media, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1217, 1240
(2015).
322. See Allen, supra note 315, at 209–10.
323. Long, supra note 321, at 1245.
324. Plaza Auto Ctr. (Plaza Auto I), 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 (2014).
325. See Allen, supra note 315, at 217.
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to social media cases.326 If the subject matter is not related to traditionally
protected topics, such as wages or conditions of employment, that factor
should weigh against protection.327 Under the nature of the outburst, the
NLRB may continue to consider whether the employee used profanity or
other insulting language and whether the language was directed at an
individual or at a policy.328 Finally, if an employer’s unfair labor practice
provokes the employee’s post, that factor should weigh in favor of
protection.329
Critics of applying Atlantic Steel to social media activity may argue
that it will negatively impact the employer’s ability to maintain its
reputation and brand image due to negative employee posts.330 However,
the Atlantic Steel analysis only comes into play if the social media post
was an instance of “concerted activity” that is afforded Section 7
protection.331 Concerted activity requires group action, not action by an
individual employee on his own behalf.332 Mere complaining without the
objective of taking action is also not considered concerted activity.333
Since the NLRB would not apply Atlantic Steel to cases that do not involve
concerted activity, and most social media posts do not involve concerted
activity, the framework will not unduly burden employers seeking to
manage their corporate image online.334
3. Adapting the Atlantic Steel Framework to the Picket Line
Since the adoption of Clear Pine Mouldings, the NLRB has utilized
an objective standard to determine whether an employee lost the protection
of the Act—whether conduct reasonably tended to coerce or intimidate
other employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.335 Applying
Atlantic Steel to picket line conduct would allow the NLRB to balance
employee misconduct against an employer’s unfair practices, as it did in

326. Id. at 216.
327. See id.
328. See Plaza Auto I, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341
N.L.R.B. 796, 807–08 (2004)).
329. Allen, supra note 315, at 216.
330. See id. at 218.
331. Id.
332. Long, supra note 321.
333. Id. at 1223.
334. Allen, supra note 315, at 218.
335. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced,
765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
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pre-Clear Pine Mouldings cases.336 Application of Atlantic Steel to the
picket line would require modification of the place-of-the-discussion
factor.337 The NLRB would not need to modify the remaining Atlantic
Steel factors, but their application would result in a change to the scope of
what conduct on the picket line the Act will protect.338
To adapt the Atlantic Steel framework for the picket line setting, the
NLRB should consider both the place and the time of the conduct under
the first factor.339 Employees may picket on or near company property, but
they may not engage in lawful strikes in the working area.340 Employees
are also not on company time while they are striking.341 Since striking
employees are not in the working area or on company time, the employer
does not have as strong of an interest in maintaining order.342 Therefore,
the time and place of the conduct would generally favor protection in a
picket line case.343
The previous test in Clear Pine Mouldings, whether an employee’s
conduct was coercive or intimidating, can be incorporated into the second
factor of the Atlantic Steel framework.344 The second Atlantic Steel factor
considers the nature of the employee’s outburst. Obscene, profane, and
personal attacks, as well as threatening or coercive conduct would weigh
against protection.345 The use of this factor would change the scope of

336. Under the Thayer doctrine, which pre-dated Clear Pine Mouldings, the
NLRB balanced an employer’s unfair labor practices against an employee’s
misconduct to determine if the employees lost the protection of the Act. Albin
Renauer, Reinstatement of Unfair Labor Practice Strikers Who Engage in StrikeRelated Misconduct: Repudiation of the Thayer Doctrine by Clear Pine
Mouldings, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 226, 247 (1986).
337. See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B 814, 816 (1979).
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. In NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., the Supreme Court held that a
“sit-down strike,” in which employees occupied the plant and refused to leave,
was not protected by the Act. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
341. Employers will not continue to pay workers who are on strike, but the
union pay provides employees benefits out of a strike fund. Labor Strike FAQs,
FINDLAW, https://employment.findlaw.com/wages-and-benefits/labor-strike-faqs
.html#:~:text=Workers%20on%20strike%20will%20not,to%20pay%20workers
%20on%20strike [https://perma.cc/79EC-JLXP] (last updated May 2, 2017).
342. See Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. (Plaza Auto I), 355 N.L.R.B. 493, 494 (2010).
343. See Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B at 816.
344. See Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984),
enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
345. See Plaza Auto I, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977.
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protection that Clear Pine Mouldings previously offered.346 Under Clear
Pine Mouldings, profane and insulting language would not lose protection
of the Act if it was not threatening or coercive; whereas under Atlantic
Steel, profane and insulting language would weigh against, but not
automatically result in loss of, protection.347 Conversely, threatening or
coercive language did automatically result in loss of protection under
Clear Pine Mouldings; while under Atlantic Steel, it would merely weigh
against protection.348
Under Clear Pine Mouldings, the NLRB did not consider whether the
employer engaged in an unfair labor practice that provoked the strike.349
By utilizing the Atlantic Steel framework in picket line cases, the NLRB
would consider an employer’s unfair labor practices under the fourth
factor.350 If an employer has committed an unfair labor practice that
provokes a strike, and an employee engages in misconduct on the picket
line, then both sides have committed a wrong.351 If the Board orders
reinstatement of the employee, then the employer faces the consequences
for its unfair labor practice, but the employee does not face the
consequences for his or her misconduct.352 If the Board does not order
reinstatement, the employee faces the consequences, but the employer
does not.353 By using Atlantic Steel, the NLRB would be able to use the
fourth factor to balance the wrongs committed by each party and take
action against the more egregious wrongdoer.354 Using the fourth factor,
the Board can consider the severity of any unfair labor practices and would
be more likely to protect conduct that occurs during an unfair-laborpractice strike than conduct that occurs during an economic strike.355
346. See Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046.
347. See id.; Plaza Auto I, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977.
348. See Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046; Plaza Auto I, 360
N.L.R.B. at 977.
349. See Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 1044.
350. See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B 814, 816 (1979).
351. Renauer, supra note 336, at 248.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. See id.
355. An unfair-labor-practice strike is one that employees initiate or prolong
in response to an employer’s unfair labor practice. An economic strike is any other
type of strike not prohibited by law or by a collective bargaining agreement. A
strike that begins as an economic strike can convert to an unfair-labor-practice
strike if an employer’s unfair labor practice prolongs the strike. An economic
striker who is permanently replaced is only entitled to reinstatement if there is a
vacancy in an equivalent position, while unfair labor practice strikers must be
reinstated, even if the employer hired permanent replacement workers. Michael
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4. The Advantages of Retaining the Atlantic Steel Standard
Applying Atlantic Steel to conduct that falls short of abusive,
regardless of the specific setting of the conduct, will retain a higher
standard of protection for Section 7 activity while simplifying the Board’s
analysis.356 The NLRB has applied the Atlantic Steel standard for over 40
years.357 Employers and labor organizations are familiar with the Atlantic
Steel framework and how the NLRB applies it.358 While the courts have
sometimes disagreed with the NLRB’s application of the standard in
individual cases, the courts have approved of the standard itself.359
In General Motors LLC, the NLRB criticized Atlantic Steel because
its application provided inconsistent results.360 The Board did not address
how its own composition and reliance on adjudication rather than
rulemaking may contribute to the lack of consistent results.361 The NLRB
consists of political appointees.362 Each new presidential administration
eventually results in turnover of Board membership, and changes to the
political makeup of its members are often followed by significant policy
changes.363 During the Trump administration, the Republican controlled
NLRB repeatedly overturned prior precedent, frequently in cases where
the parties to the case did not ask them to.364 An empirical analysis of
NLRB decisions during the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton presidencies
found that one of the most important predictors of how a particular panel
will vote is the political makeup of its members.365 It is the political nature
D. Moberly, Striking a Happy Medium: The Conversion of Unfair Labor Practice
Strikes to Economic Strikes, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 137–38 (2001).
356. See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B 814, 816 (1979).
357. Brief for National Treasury Employees Union as Amicus Curiae at 11,
Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21, 2020)
(No. 14-CA-197985), 2020 WL 4193017.
358. Id. at 6.
359. Id. at 11.
360. See General Motors II, 2020 WL 4193017, at *8.
361. See id.
362. National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 USC § 153(a).
363. Garden, supra note 87, at 1476.
364. Robert Iafolla, Labor Board Repeatedly Topples Precedent Without Public
Input, BLOOMBERG L. (July 12, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw
.com/daily-labor-report/labor-board-repeatedly-topples-precedent-without-publicinput [https://perma.cc/BF6Q-C359]. The author notes 10 decisions during the
Trump administration that overturned precedent without giving prior notice or an
opportunity for public input.
365. Semet, supra note 19, at 273. This study examined the decisions of threemember panels of the NLRB and found that a panel of all Democrats will grant
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of the Board, rather than a flaw in the Atlantic Steel framework, that results
in inconsistent adjudication results.366 Therefore, a lack of consistent
results alone should not prevent retention of the Atlantic Steel framework
for conduct that falls short of abusive.367
To provide clarity to employers, unions, and Administrative Law
Judges, the NLRB should adopt a clear definition of “abusive conduct”
and clarify the standard that should apply to non-abusive conduct
occurring during otherwise protected activity.368 “Abusive conduct”
should be defined to cover offensive language on the basis of a statutorily
protected characteristic, or other conduct that directly creates liability for
the employer under applicable law.369 “Abusive conduct” should not
encompass merely profane or insulting language, as this would
unnecessarily restrict employees in their exercise of protected activity.370
For conduct that falls short of abusive, the NLRB should consolidate the
setting-specific standards into one modified Atlantic Steel framework that
applies to workplace discussions with management, social media, and the
picket line.
CONCLUSION
Historical NLRB standards for determining when employee conduct
loses the protection of the NLRA conflicted with employer obligations
under federal, state, and local antidiscrimination statutes.371 The General
Motors LLC decision brought the interpretation of the NLRA into closer
alignment with these antidiscrimination laws.372 At the same time, the
decision left two broad questions unanswered: (1) what is the scope of
“abusive conduct” covered by the decision and (2) how should instances
of misconduct that are not “abusive” be analyzed in the future?373 The
relief to the pro-labor party 90% of the time, a panel with one Republican and two
Democrats 84% of the time, a panel with two Republicans and one Democrat 75%
of the time, and an all-Republican panel 60% of the time. The political makeup of
the panel and the decision below of the Administrative Law Judge were the two
most important factors in predicting panel outcomes.
366. See Garden, supra note 87, at 1476; see Semet, supra note 19.
367. See Garden, supra note 87; see Semet, supra note 19.
368. See Miscimarra, supra note 250.
369. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13, at 292.
370. McDermott, supra note 21, at 6.
371. See Vann & Logan, supra note 13, at 292.
372. See Gen. Motors LLC (General Motors II), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July
21, 2020), 2020 WL 4193017.
373. See id.
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NLRB should clarify the scope of “abusive conduct” to include conduct
that directly creates employer liability under applicable employment laws,
such as Title VII.374 This will adequately balance employer obligations
under the NLRA and Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws, and
provide a flexible standard that adapts to differences in local legislation.375
The scope of “abusive conduct” should exclude conduct that is merely
profane or insulting.376 This interpretation will uphold the purpose of the
NLRA by maintaining the balance of power between employers and
employees and protecting employees who are engaging in concerted
activity.377 In instances of misconduct that occur during otherwise
protected activity, the NLRB should apply Atlantic Steel if the conduct
falls short of abusive, regardless of whether the conduct occurred in
meetings with management, on social media, or on the picket line.378 This
application will reduce the complexity of the Board’s analysis while
ensuring that employees will continue to have the ability to exercise their
right to engage in concerted activity without retaliation based solely on
their participation in those activities.379

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
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